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PRIVILEGE & VOTING FOR PREDATORS: EXPLORING THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRIVILEGE AND VOTING FOR SEX 
OFFENDERS 
 
REILLY SIMMONS, BUTLER UNIVERSITY 
MENTOR: GREGORY SHUFELDT 
 
Abstract 
This paper was inspired by my confusion that women voted for sexual 
predators in several elections in 2016, despite the fact that women are usually the 
victims of sexual misconduct. My research question was, Does privilege affect 
political party crossover when a candidate is accused of sexual misconduct? I 
hypothesized that a woman’s likelihood of crossing political party lines when a 
candidate is accused of sexual misconduct decreases as her privilege increases, and 
that the opposite would therefore also be true: as a woman’s privilege decreases, 
her likelihood of crossing political party lines increases when a candidate is accused 
of sexual misconduct.  
I used a split-sample survey experiment, then ran four bivariate tests. The 
first bivariate test measured the impact of partisanship on political party crossover 
when the candidate is accused of sexual misconduct. The second bivariate test 
tested the impact of privilege, controlling for partisanship. The third bivariate test 
was done differently for men and women. The last bivariate test measured whether 
privilege—controlling for partisanship—had an impact on the dependent variable 
separately among men and women.  
I found my hypothesis to be wrong. A woman’s privilege does not 
significantly influence whether she is willing to support a candidate accused of 
sexual misconduct. Partisanship is the pivotal force in determining a woman’s 
voting habits when the candidate has been accused of sexual misconduct. I also 
found that a male’s increasing privilege increases his likelihood of crossing political 
party lines when a candidate has been accused of sexual misconduct. 
After witnessing several high-profile elections, such as the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election, and the Alabama senate election, in which candidates accused 
of sexual misconduct either won or came incredibly close to winning the election, 
one should question why. Donald Trump ultimately became president of the United 




States after more than 15 women came forward to say he sexually assaulted them 
(Pearson et al., 2020). In Alabama, Roy Moore lost his U.S. Senate race but still 
received 48.4% of the vote (Bloch et al., 2017). He was undeterred after his 2017 
loss and ran again in 2020. These are two examples of higher-profile cases. It 
should not be overlooked or understated that candidates and government officials 
at any level have been accused of sexual misconduct.  
One might assume that women, who are most often the victims of sexual 
misconduct, would change political parties to prevent the reward of a political 
office to a sex offender, yet that is not the case, as voters elected Donald Trump 
and Roy Moore only narrowly lost. This paper asks why women specifically are 
still willing to vote for candidates accused of sexual misconduct. After evaluating 
the literature on partisanship and elections with sexual misconduct accusations, 
previous studies have yet to examine whether the several levels of privilege a 
woman possesses might explain the results of such elections. This paper seeks to 
answer the research question of whether privilege affects political party crossover 
when a candidate is accused of sexual misconduct.  
Literature Review 
Certain aspects of a person’s identity are powerful predictors of their voting 
patterns. Many factors predict why people vote the way they do. Previous literature 
shows how a person’s race, sexual orientation, and socioeconomic status are all 
indicators of how that person may vote (Black & Stone, 2005; Crenshaw, 1997; 
Dunlap et al., 2007). A person’s privilege, and how privilege is defined, can 
determine voting habits or patterns (McIntosh, 2007). Partisanship is another 
powerful predictor of a person’s vote. This paper explores the connection between 
a woman’s privilege and her likelihood to cross over political parties when a 
candidate is involved in a sexual-misconduct scandal. This connection is explored 
because of the gap in the literature regarding voting for candidates accused of 
sexual misconduct and the types of people voting for these candidates. Here, the 
focus is specifically on women because sexual misconduct affects women at a 
greater rate than it does men (World Health Organization, 2002). This study 
questions whether privilege effects political party crossover in the instance of a 
woman’s party candidate being accused of sexual misconduct. The hypothesis is 
that with an increasing amount of privilege, a woman is less likely to cross political 
party lines when a candidate is accused of sexual misconduct.  
Partisanship plays a powerful determining role in voting habits (Bafumi & 
Shapiro, 2009; Campbell et al., 1960; McCarty et al., 2016; Miller, 1991). 




Partisanship has returned in a form that is both more ideological and more issue-
based along liberal-conservative lines than it has been in more than 30 years. Voters 
are more influenced by partisan factors because these factors are more long-term 
compared to election-specific factors, which are seen as short-term. Voters have a 
certain attachment to their parties, and these loyalties to parties are what create the 
basic division in voters. The strength and direction of party identification are facts 
of central importance in accounting for attitude and behavior. Most Americans hold 
this sense of attachment to one party or another (Campbell et al., 1960). This 
attachment to one’s party has held constant over different time periods, regions, 
genders, and races. Miller (1991) explains that year in and year out, women have 
been no more likely than men to cast party votes or to defect and cross party lines 
to vote for a president. Beginning in the mid-1970s, politics became much more 
divisive, with more Democrats staking out consistently liberal positions and more 
Republicans supporting exclusively conservative ones. This trend made it 
increasingly difficult for moderates to win their parties’ contests (McCarty et al., 
2016).  
Additionally, society tends to view various types of scandals differently. 
Overall, people are more forgiving of sexual-misconduct scandals than of financial 
scandals, such as tax-evasion scandals, with the passage of time (Doherty et al., 
2011), perhaps because the former depress evaluations not only of the politician’s 
personal attributes but also of his or her professional judgment. Another 
explanation for this discrepancy may be that although the incidents behind moral 
scandals could imaginably happen “in the heat of the moment,” financial scandals 
usually involve forethought and/or continued criminal behavior. Involvement in a 
financial scandal may thus be seen as a stronger signal of a politician’s fundamental 
character than may involvement in a sex scandal. For a political figure, reputation 
is a decisive asset. Inappropriate behavior, such as involvement in a scandal, may 
leave the candidate vulnerable to commentary from other political candidates, yet 
candidates involved in scandals have still been elected to office. One factor that 
may be particularly influential in determining the extent to which past involvement 
in a scandal can be used against a candidate is whether it occurred recently or long 
ago. In the research, however, the distinction of “moral” scandal is not explicitly 
made clear. Berinsky and colleagues (2011) found that White voters penalize Black 
candidates more than White candidates when there are instances of sexual 
misconduct. If the scandal cue plays out in a racialized way, White voters who hold 
negative attitudes toward Blacks should respond more strongly to that scandal. In 
other words, a racialized cue should work more strongly among people who are 
already receptive to it. In their experiment, Berinsky et al. found that Barack Obama 




suffered a higher penalty than John Edwards in overall evaluations. A negative 
story involving rumors of a sexual-infidelity scandal hurt Obama more than it hurt 
Edwards both directly and immediately, on his overall favorability rating, as well 
as indirectly and potentially, through perceptions of his liberal ideology. The results 
are not limited to a particular partisan or ideological group. In these ways, Black 
candidates do seem to suffer a racial disadvantage with White voters. 
There are different levels of privilege and ways to measure the amount of 
privilege someone has. One way of measuring privilege uses a person’s 
socioeconomic status (Dunlap et al., 2007). Economic privilege can be defined as 
having been reared in socioeconomic conditions that are financially stable and 
secure. In their article on social class bias and implications for training and practice, 
Liu et al. (2007) focus on White middle-class privilege. They forgo all other 
possible intersections related to race, making this a limited argument. In society, it 
is seen as normal to want to move upward with regard to socioeconomic status. 
When a person does not express desire for upward social mobility or cannot move 
up, this is viewed as deviant. Middle-class members frequently expect to get what 
they want because they are favored in economic institutions. Individuals from lower 
socioeconomic statuses believe that they are not as likely to have support from 
economic institutions and that they are more likely to face discrimination. The 
middle class is favored because it is the largest social class in society. The systems 
are set up to benefit middle-class members at a greater rate than lower-class 
members. McIntosh (2007) explains how socioeconomic privilege embodies itself 
through housing and the ability to move if needed. McIntosh then goes further to 
show that socioeconomic privilege includes the ability to choose where to receive 
an education. Other aspects include affording access to legal and medical help. 
Because the vast majority of societies are capitalistic, this allows the rich to exploit 
the poor underclass. 
A second way of measuring privilege is via race (Crenshaw, 1997; Ghitza 
& Gelman, 2013; Jackson, 1999; Lucal, 1996). Crenshaw (1997) discusses how it 
is uncommon for White people to plainly mention their whiteness in political and 
academic discourse. Whiteness categorizes people into social areas that are easily 
distinguishable. A majority of White people view themselves as normal nonracists 
and are therefore often silent in times of struggle for people of color, in order to 
protect their own racial privilege. This silence is a type of language that many 
politicians take advantage of. By protecting their White privilege, they reinforce 
the idea of White superiority. This causes distrust and resentment between White 
people and people of color, and the underlying resentment builds into racial 




tensions that drive political preferences. Ghitza and Gelman (2013) argue that the 
usual political discourse is that different demographic groups vote as homogenous 
blocs when, in fact, they show notable heterogeneity. The likelihood of one of the 
richest African Americans voting for a Democratic candidate was higher than that 
of one of the poorest African Americans voting for a Democratic candidate in the 
2004 and 2008 elections. The turnout swing of voters is largely driven by African 
Americans and other young minorities. Younger White voters did not increase their 
turnout. Ghitza and Gelman’s study is limited because it focused on the elections 
of only 2004 and 2008 and provided only inferences about a small quantity of 
demographics. 
Jackson (1999) explains that when White people deny the existence of 
White privilege, they must be conscious that it exists. White people are systemically 
advantaged in society because our society was built around White people. White 
people do not have to argue their identities like people of color might, and they are 
in a position of comfort, knowing that they are usually the majority in social and 
political situations. These social and political situations lead to White people being 
in a position of power over people of color. White participants in Jackson’s study 
felt empowered to keep a feeling of superiority. Lucal (1996) describes how race is 
thought to specifically apply to people of color, which leads White people to see it 
as something that does not affect them. Racial inequality discourse is spoken in 
ways that do not affect White society. Thus, White society can look at racial 
discrimination with disengagement. Whites have opportunities for not realizing 
how race works and not remembering how it works, whereas people of color are 
not afforded that luxury. White privilege gives White people the option of hearing 
or not hearing people of color. They can choose when they do and do not listen to 
different voices.  
A third way of determining privilege is the sexual orientation of a person 
(Black & Stone, 2005; Blumenfeld, 1992; Bohan 1996). Black and Stone (2005) 
find that sexual-orientation privilege is based on heterosexuality being viewed as 
the most common expression of sexual orientation in society. Any orientation that 
strays from this expression is looked down upon, deemed inferior and wrong. 
Heterosexual people have a sense of superiority and an exaggerated belief in their 
self-worth. They also may have misperceptions about the world around them. 
Heterosexual people may believe that because they are heterosexual, they deserve 
special power and entitlements. For example, because they are heterosexual, the 
perceived norm, they may feel that their values are the correct values, or the only 
values that should be accepted, simply because they represent this norm. This 




distortion of reality is painful for people to accept because they demand an 
examination of the consequences and demand accountability. Being accountable 
for privilege means that the privileged are ready to relinquish benefits and 
entitlements to which they have become habituated and that they recognize their 
aspect in the plausible oppression of others. Blumenfeld (1992) finds that any 
sexual orientation other than heterosexuality is thought of as able to be changed or 
that a person chooses to deviate from the norm. Even though homosexuality has 
been present throughout history, society still views sexual orientation as something 
that can change and that needs to be changed. Those who stray from the existing 
normative behaviors of heterosexual people are sometimes thought of as defectors 
of their sex. There are preconceived notions of what someone’s sexual orientation 
needs to conform to or what someone’s sexual orientation should avoid. When 
heterosexual people feel uncomfortable in an environment, they lash out at the 
minority sexual orientation.  
Bohan (1996) explains how society rewards heterosexual people with 
benefits such as socially suppored marriage and dating, therefore granting 
heterosexual people security within their sexuality. Heterosexual people do not 
have to suffer from violence or discrimination from institutions of any kind. They 
are also guaranteed a level of self-acceptance, in that society favors and approves 
of their sexual orientation. The system favors heterosexuality and does not question 
the actions of heterosexual people, whereas any other sexual orientation is 
questioned and the actions of people who are not heterosexual are under constant 
scrutiny because they are not approved of in totality by society. The dominance of 
Christianity in Europe and the United States feeds the narrative of heterosexuality 
being the only correct and natural sexual orientation; Christianity deemed 
homosexuality as a sin against God and an offense against the state.  
The literature provides information about how partisanship heavily 
influences the way people vote, how the context of privilege affects the way people 
vote, and how a candidate’s involvement in a scandal and the race of that candidate 
affects how people vote. This paper focuses on the relationship between a woman’s 
privilege and her likelihood of crossing over political party lines when a candidate 
is accused of sexual misconduct, because this is one gap found in the literature. The 
more privilege a woman has, the less likely she is to cross political party lines when 
a candidate is accused of sexual misconduct.  
This gap is important to explore because understanding the conceptions of 
privilege is important for voters and for scholars. Political party crossover when a 
candidate is accused of sexual misconduct is important for policy makers to 




understand because the voting patterns of certain people can be revealed. Policy 
makers can take advantage of this information to determine what types of people 
are more likely to vote for a candidate accused of sexual misconduct, and what 
groups are absolutely unwilling to vote for such a candidate or would cross political 
party lines instead. This phenomenon is also important for scholars to understand 
in order to conduct more research on the types of people who are more likely to 
cross political party lines in a time of such intense party polarization. Looking at 
how different women view sexual misconduct when it comes to potential political 
candidates can become a new predictor of how certain women vote. 
White women who are heterosexual and of middle-class and higher 
socioeconomic statuses are more privileged than those who are not White, 
heterosexual, and of middle-class socioeconomic status. There are varying degrees 
of privilege, however; a woman can fit into one of the three categories and still be 
more privileged than a woman who does not fit into any of the categories. Besides 
privilege, partisan loyalty also plays a part in the crossover vote of women. 
Partisanship is the biggest determinant of voting habits. The prediction for this 
study is that with a woman’s increasing privilege, her likelihood to cross political 
party lines will decrease when a political candidate is accused of sexual misconduct. 
Research Design 
The goal of this study is to determine the relationship between a woman’s 
privilege and when or if she crosses political party lines when a candidate is accused 
of sexual misconduct. The focus is on women specifically because sexual 
misconduct is deemed a women’s issue (World Health Organization, 2002). 
Previous research and historical trends have indicated that a person’s voting 
behaviors can be predicted by several factors. First, a person’s partisanship is one 
of the most powerful predictors of voting habits (Bafumi & Shapiro, 2009; Berinsky 
et al., 2011; Campbell et al., 1960). People have strong allegiance and loyalty to 
the political party they identify with. Second is their privilege—defined in this 
study through race, socioeconomic status, and sexual orientation (Black & Stone, 
2005; Blumenfeld, 1992; Bohan, 1996; Crenshaw, 1997; Dunlap et al., 2007; 
Jackson, 1999; Liu et al., 2007; Lucal, 1996). The aim of this study is to determine 
if there is a relationship between a woman’s privilege and her likelihood of crossing 
political party lines when the candidate from her political party is accused of sexual 
misconduct.  
This study takes the existing research a step further by focusing on what 
types of women are more likely to cross political party lines when a candidate is 




accused of sexual misconduct. It goes beyond the scope of regular voting habits 
and patterns by specifically including in the study a candidate accused of sexual 
misconduct. The independent variable is the level of privilege a woman has, and 
the dependent variable is a woman’s likelihood of crossing political party lines 
when a candidate is accused of sexual misconduct. The hypothesis is that as a 
woman’s privilege increases, her likelihood of crossing political party lines when a 
candidate is accused of sexual misconduct decreases.  
More-privileged women will prioritize winning at the expense of supporting 
a candidate accused of sexual misconduct. Privilege allows a woman to overlook 
the issue of sexual misconduct and to prioritize winning an election. The less 
privilege a woman has, the more likely she will prioritize punishing a candidate 
accused of sexual misconduct by not voting for that candidate. Privileged women 
are more likely to see their family members or friends in candidates accused of 
sexual misconduct. A large majority of candidates running for office are wealthy 
White straight males. This fits the mold for a man who is present within a wealthy 
White straight woman’s life. That is, the more privileged a woman becomes, the 
less likely she may become to believe the accusations of sexual misconduct against 
a candidate because she can see a friend or relative in the accused candidate.  
Increasing privilege ® Decreasing likelihood of crossing political party 
lines when candidate is accused of sexual misconduct 
In contrast, women with less privilege have an increased likelihood of 
crossing political party lines when a candidate is accused of sexual misconduct. A 
woman with less privilege can more easily relate to a candidate’s accuser. She may 
have more exposure to incidents of sexual harassment, assault, and violence. She 
may have more friends or family members who have been victims of sexual 
misconduct and may therefore be more willing to punish a candidate accused of 
sexual misconduct. 
Decreasing privilege ® Increasing likelihood of crossing political party 
lines when candidate is accused of sexual misconduct  
To test these hypotheses, an online survey was administered through the 
online survey platform Qualtrics. The 61-question survey included questions 
designed to tap into political attitudes and behaviors, with each question being 
provided by a different student in an undergraduate research methods course (see 
Appendix A). The sample was recruited from Amazon's Mechanical Turk 
crowdsourcing program. Mechanical Turk, in spite of being a more recent tool for 
recruiting survey respondents, is inexpensive and is documented to produce reliable 




data (Berinsky et al., 2012; Buhrmester et al., 2011; Mason & Suri, 2012; Levay et 
al., 2016). Although the convenience sample limits the ability to draw conclusions 
regarding the full American public, it provides sufficient leverage to test the 
hypothesis. The survey, available for one week during the spring of 2018, recruited 
respondents by paying them $0.50 upon completion of the survey. The survey had 
a total population of 751 respondents. The average time of completion for 
respondents was 13 minutes and 42 seconds. This translated to an effective average 
hourly rate of $2.24. 
The survey includes an original survey experiment in which respondents are 
divided into a split sample of a fictitious Democratic primary race and a fictitious 
Republican primary race. Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the two 
hypothetical scenarios in which a candidate is accused of sexual misconduct. The 
wording for the fictitious Democratic-race scenario is “Imagine there is a contested 
Democratic primary election in your state for Congress. Quinn Johnson, one of the 
candidates running for this office, has been accused of sexual misconduct in their 
history. This candidate is the best chance for the Democratic party to win the 
general election against their Republican opponent. If this candidate wins, the 
Democratic party is guaranteed the majority in Congress. How likely are you to 
vote for Quinn Johnson?” The respondent could choose from four options: very 
likely, likely, unlikely, and very unlikely. For the fictitious Republican-race scenario, 
the question is “Imagine there is a contested Republican primary election in your 
state for Congress. Quinn Johnson, one of the candidates running for this office, 
has been accused of sexual misconduct in their history. This candidate is the best 
chance for the Republican party to win the election against their Democratic 
opponent. If this candidate wins, the Republican party is guaranteed the majority in 
Congress. How likely are you to vote for Quinn Johnson?” The respondents had the 
same options of choosing from very likely, likely, unlikely, and very unlikely.  
This question serves to determine who crosses political party lines when a 
candidate is accused of sexual misconduct. The wording is the same for each, 
except one race is Democratic and the other is Republican. For the data analysis, 
only the people who self-identified as Republicans receiving the Republican 
experiment and the Democrats receiving the Democratic experiment were 
examined. This limits the data because people who identify as political 
independents, people who identify as Democrats and received the Republican 
experiment, and people who identify as Republicans and received the Democratic 
experiment were removed from the analysis. The name of the fictitious candidate 
is the same for both races and is purposefully relatively gender neutral, to prevent 




explicit gender bias. The respondents have a choice to select if they are very likely, 
likely, unlikely, or very unlikely to vote for the fictitious candidate. The responses 
were codified as who voted for the candidate—those being the respondents who 
selected very likely and likely—and who did not vote for the candidate—those being 
the respondents who selected very unlikely and unlikely. Those who answered 
unlikely or very unlikely were considered as crossing the political party line and 
voting against the candidate accused of sexual misconduct. The people who chose 
likely or very likely were considered as unwilling to cross over, prioritizing winning 
by voting for the candidate accused of sexual misconduct. 
Beyond assessing whether partisans are willing to cross over, this study also 
examines the extent of crossing over based on the degree of privilege based on a 
woman’s sexual orientation, socioeconomic status, and race. The survey questions 
that measure these demographic characteristics ask about participants’ gender 
identification, race/ethnicity, sexual orientation, and income. Because in this study, 
privilege is defined by these categories, these questions help assess the level of 
privilege of each respondent. The question that determined gender asked, “What is 
your gender?” with the options male, female, and prefer to self-describe. Because 
only one respondent chose the option prefer to self-describe, the current study 
cannot draw conclusions about this group of people, and this respondent was not 
included in the data analysis. Respondents included 371 males and 378 females.  
The survey item that determined race was “Please specify your race or 
ethnicity (check all that apply).” The options given to respondents were White, 
Hispanic or Latino, Black or African American, Asian/Pacific Islander, Native 
American or American Indian, and Other (Please Specify). Race was codified as 
White or nonwhite. Six hundred twenty (620) respondents identified as White, and 
131 identified as nonwhite.  
The survey item to determine sexual orientation asked, “Do you consider 
yourself to be:” with the options heterosexual or straight, gay, lesbian, bisexual, or 
not listed above (please specify). This group was codified as straight or non-
straight. Six hundred seventy-five (675) respondents identified as straight, and 75 
identified as non-straight.  
The survey item to gauge level of income was phrased, “Information about 
income is very important to understand how people are doing financially these days. 
What is your total household income?” The options were less than $10,000, 
$10,000 to $19,000, $20,000 to $29,000, $30,000 to 39,000, $40,000 to $49,000, 
$50,000 to $59,000, $60,000 to $69,000, $70,000 to $79,000, $80,000 to $89,000, 
$90,000 to $99,000, and $100,000 or more. Income was codified as less than 




$50,000 and more than $50,000. Three hundred thirty-four (334) respondents had 
incomes less than $50,000, and 416 had incomes greater than $50,000. 
The independent variable is the degree of privilege a women enjoys. 
Privilege within the race category is defined as being White. Privilege within the 
gender category would be defined as being male, but this study focuses specifically 
on women and their likelihood to cross political party lines when a candidate is 
accused of sexual misconduct. Privilege within the category of sexual orientation 
is defined as being heterosexual. Privilege within the income category is defined as 
having a household income above $50,000, indicating a participant has reached 
middle-class or higher standing.  
To compare privileged women to a group, data for privileged men was 
included in order to understand if there is a difference in how privilege affects men 
and women. The general hypothesis was that with increasing privilege, a person’s 
likelihood of crossing political party lines when a candidate is accused of sexual 
misconduct will decrease.  
In this sense, partisanship was controlled for because it is such a strong 
predictor. A Democrat who received the Republican-primary experiment might be 
more willing to not vote for the candidate accused of sexual misconduct because 
crossing over would involve voting within the political party the participant 
identified with. The same logic applies to Republicans who received the 
Democratic primary experiment. Partisanship was originally measured in the 
survey with the question “Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a/an … 
?” The options the respondent could choose from were Strong Democrat, Not so 
strong Democrat, Independent, Not so strong Republican, and Strong Republican. 
For the current study, partisanship was dichotomized as either Democrat or 
Republican. Independents were not included because their behavior was not of 
interest for this study. Respondents included 198 Republicans and 312 Democrats. 
By taking partisanship into account, this study is able to examine the relationship 
between partisanship and privilege and the extent to which that relationship varies 
by gender. To assess the how privilege affects voting amid scandals, this study 
relies on a series of regression tests discussed in the following section. 
Results 
The first test measured the impact of partisanship on political party 
crossover when the candidate is accused of sexual misconduct. This test did not 
account for privilege or gender. Being a Democrat makes someone more unwilling 




to support a candidate accused of sexual misconduct compared to being a 
Republican. This test had a p value of .004 and therefore is statistically significant. 
The coefficient for this value is 0.184, which means that Democrats are more likely 
than Republicans to punish candidates accused of sexual misconduct (Table 1). 
Thirty-eight percent (38%) of Republicans punish the candidate accused of sexual 
assault, meaning that most Republicans prioritize supporting the candidate with the 
best chance to win. Fifty-six percent (56%) of Democrats are willing to punish the 
candidate accused of sexual assault. 
 
Table 1. Coefficients of Privilege, Party, and Crossing Over 
 

















Privilege  .056 
(0.046) 
















N 254 254 121 132 121 132 
***p < .01. **p < .05. *p < .10. 
 
The next regression tested the impact of privilege, controlling for 
partisanship. In this test, being a Democrat still has an impact. When controlling 
for partisanship, privilege does not have an independent impact on the likelihood 
of support for a candidate accused of sexual misconduct. The p value for being a 
Democrat and not supporting the candidate accused of sexual misconduct was .002, 
which is statistically significant. The coefficient for this value is 0.20, which means 
that Democrats are more likely to not support a candidate accused of sexual 
misconduct than are Republicans. Controlling for privilege, 24% of Republicans 
punish the candidate compared to 44% of Democrats. The p value for privilege, a 
four-point scale that captures race, gender, and income, was .228 and was not 
statistically significant.  
The third test examined differences between men and women. Being a 
Democrat has no impact among men; 44% of men, regardless of partisanship, 
continue to vote for a candidate accused of sexual misconduct. Among women, 




being a Democrat makes someone more unwilling to support a candidate accused 
of sexual misconduct compared to being a Republican. The p value was less than 
.0001, so it can be said with 99.9% confidence that partisanship affects women’s 
unwillingness to support a candidate accused of sexual misconduct if the women 
are Democrats. Here the gender gap is particularly notable. While only 30% of 
Republican women punish this type of candidate, more than 64% of Democratic 
women refuse to support the candidate accused of sexual misconduct. 
The final test assessed whether privilege, controlling for partisanship, has 
an impact on the dependent variable separately among men and women. For men, 
privilege, not partisanship, matters. For women, partisanship, not privilege, matters. 
The p value for privilege among men is .071, which is statistically significant with 
a 93% confidence interval. The p value for men being Democrats having an effect 
on willingness to vote for a candidate accused of sexual misconduct was .531 and 
therefore was not statistically significant. Roughly 14% of men without any 
additional privilege, regardless of partisanship, refuse to support a candidate 
accused of sexual misconduct. For each one-unit increase in privilege (in terms of 
race, sexual orientation, or income), men become 12% more likely to punish that 
candidate. For comparison, a nonwhite, non-straight male making less than $50,000 
is quite likely to prioritize winning, whereas a straight White male earning more 
than $50,000 has a fifty-fifty chance of crossing over and refusing to support a 
copartisan accused of sexual misconduct.  
Among women, it is partisanship, not privilege, that shapes views toward 
the candidates. The p value for women with the highest level of privilege is .871, 
making it statistically insignificant; however, it is in the direction predicted of 
women with more privilege being less likely to cross political party lines when their 
candidate is accused of sexual misconduct. The p value for women being 
Democrats having an effect on willingness to vote for a candidate accused of sexual 
misconduct was .0001, making it statistically significant with 99.99% confidence. 
The coefficient of 0.332 reveals a massive partisan gap. Controlling for privilege, 
33% of Republican women punish a candidate accused of sexual misconduct. For 
Democratic women, it is a different story; more than 66% of Democratic women 
refuse to support a candidate accused of sexual misconduct.  
Discussion 
Ultimately, this study found that privilege has a positive impact on males 
crossing party lines. As privilege increases among males, they are more likely to 
cross over and thus punish a candidate accused of sexual misconduct, although in 




the expected direction, privilege among females does not have a statistically 
significant impact. For females, partisanship has an impact, not privilege. Female 
Democrats are more likely to punish a candidate accused of sexual misconduct, 
regardless of privilege. Partisanship has no impact among men. Among women, 
being a Democrat makes one more unwilling to support a candidate accused of 
sexual misconduct, compared to being a Republican. For men, privilege makes one 
willing to cross over. 
Partisanship playing a preeminent role for women is of particular note, 
given the increasing gender gap. Women who self-identify as Republican appear to 
be unmoved on this particular issue. Republican women are less likely to self-
identify as feminist and less likely to view feminism as empowering (Barroso, 
2020). Issues that are often conceptualized as women’s issues push women to be 
sorted into Democrat and Republican camps. The Republican party has a certain 
platform on abortion, reproductive health, gender roles, and tradition, so perhaps it 
would be unreasonable to expect sexual misconduct to make Republican women 
support their party any less. As Freeman (1986) believes, Republican women think 
the best thing they can do for women is to elect Republicans. Another way to think 
of this is that women who self-identify as Republicans are already choosing a stance 
on sexual misconduct. There is an overwhelming partisan split among women. 
Democratic women are twice as likely as Republican women to cross over. Before 
taking privilege into account, 64% of Democratic women, compared to 30% of 
Republican women, were willing to punish a candidate accused of sexual 
misconduct. 
The findings for males are particularly interesting in that they are opposite 
of what one might expect. The implications of a man’s privilege affecting his voting 
habits versus his partisanship perhaps requires further research into his marital 
status, or testing for specific education levels, which could be factors at play in this 
occurrence. What specifically about a man’s privilege allows him to forgo his 
partisanship? Does pressure from peers, employers, relatives, spouses, and friends 
win out in an attempt to promote his own reputation or clout? Additionally, a man 
with more privilege may have greater access and time to learn about sexual-
misconduct scandals and form an opinion than might someone who is living from 
paycheck to paycheck, focusing on putting food on the table, and simply surviving. 
Perhaps this issue trumps partisanship for men, or perhaps men—as those most 
likely to engage in sexual assault (World Health Organization, 2002)—do not 
necessarily view sexual misconduct as a partisan issue. Men, having a more stable 
position in society, are afforded more freedom to decide, ponder, and debate this 




issue. Men are able to discard other males who jeopardize their positions, or they 
are also able to forgive and to welcome predators back into the fold. When taking 
privilege into account, there is a 50% chance that men will punish a fellow male 
copartisan accused of sexual misconduct. 
In terms of future research, the first step would be to replicate this study to 
increase the external validity of the findings. In particular, a larger sample size 
would be helpful in providing a broader demographic pool. The sample size for this 
study had a majority of White and straight respondents. A more diverse pool would 
provide the opportunity to examine how privilege affects voting behavior among 
people of color, people of sexual-orientation minorities, transgender people, and 
people of different socioeconomic classes.  
A larger sample size could also compensate for the design of the split 
sample. A larger universe would allow all people who identify as Democrats to be 
exposed to the fictitious Democratic-race scenario and the people who identify as 
Republicans, the fictitious Republican-race scenario. This would increase the 
number of respondents and allow for drawing more-accurate conclusions regarding 
political party crossover, because this study did not examine Democrats who 
received the fictitious Republican-race scenario or Republicans who received the 
fictitious Democratic-race scenario.  
Revising the experiment to incorporate political independents also would 
provide an opportunity to examine how those with less partisan loyalty respond to 
allegations of sexual misconduct. Political independents were not included in this 
study because the focus was on political party crossover and in today’s politics, a 
candidate is typically a Republican or Democrat, but it would be interesting to see 
how this group of people vote specifically in the instance of a candidate being 
accused of sexual misconduct. This could be a possible research topic to be pursued 
in future.  
Additionally, this experiment was within a primary election. A similar 
experiment should be conducted within a general-election environment to see if 
attitudes are different than in a primary election. Voters often act differently in 
primary versus general elections; it could be expected that partisanship would play 
an even stronger role in a general election than a primary election.  
This study also raises the question of when partisanship becomes obsolete. 
When is it too powerful? The most recent 2020 presidential election unfortunately 
brought forth a scenario not covered in my study: candidates of both political parties 
had been accused of sexual misconduct. In this instance, research should examine 




how voters respond, including what types of groups or people are more willing to 
vote third party or not vote at all because of the candidates’ sexual misconduct. It 
could also be of interest to study the specific group of people who refuse to vote for 
both major-party candidates accused of sexual misconduct and who instead choose 
to vote third party or not at all. As highlighted in this study, when it comes to the 
ballot box, #MeToo is a gendered, partisan issue.  
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Select Survey Questions 
 
1. What is your gender? 
a. Male 
b. Female 
c. Prefer to self-describe: ______ 
 
2. Please specify your race or ethnicity (check all that apply). 
a. White 
b. Hispanic or Latino 
c. Black or African American 
d. Asian/Pacific Islander 
e. Native American or American Indian 
f. Other (Please Specify): 
 
3. Do you consider yourself to be: 




e. Not listed above (Please Specify): ______ 
 
4. Information about income is very important to understand how people are doing 
financially these days. What is your total household income? Drop down menu: 
Below options 
a. Less than $10,000 
b. $10,000 to $19,999 
c. $20,000 to $29,999 
d. $30,000 to $39,999 
e. $40,000 to $49,999 
f. $50,000 to $59,999 
g. $60,000 to $69,999 
h. $70,000 to $79,999 
i. $80,000 to $89,999 




j. $90,000 to $99,999 
k. $100,000 or more 
 
5. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a/an …? 
a. Strong Democrat 
b. Not so strong Democrat 
c. Independent 
d. Not so strong Republican 
e. Strong Republican 
f. Other: (Please specify) 
 
6. (Split Sample) Fictitious Democrat Race Format: Imagine there is a contested 
Democratic primary election in your state for Congress. Quinn Johnson, one of 
the candidates running for this office, has been accused of sexual misconduct in 
their history. This candidate is the best chance for the Democratic party to win the 
general election against their Republican opponent. If this candidate wins, the 
Democratic party is guaranteed the majority in Congress. How likely are you to 
vote for Quinn Johnson?   
a. Very likely 
b. Likely 
c. Unlikely 
d. Very unlikely 
 
7. (Split Sample) Fictitious Republican Race Format: Imagine there is a contested 
Republican primary election in your state for Congress. Quinn Johnson, one of the 
candidates running for this office, has been accused of sexual misconduct in their 
history. This candidate is the best chance for the Republican party to win the 
election against their Democratic opponent. If this candidate wins, the Republican 
party is guaranteed the majority in Congress. How likely are you to vote for 
Quinn Johnson?   
a. Very likely 
b. Likely 
c. Unlikely 
d. Very unlikely 
  
